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2 1  Introduction and motivation 
 
The purpose of this review essay is to understand the economics behind the evolution of 
payments.  By payments I mean the ‘transfer of monetary value’ (in return for goods, services, or 
real or financial assets).  Understanding the evolution of payments is important from the point of 
view of a central bank since they typically take a major role in payments:  in the provision of a 
settlement asset for large-value payment systems, often in the ownership and operation of such 
systems and also overseeing these and smaller-value, retail payment systems.  In deciding what, 
in fact, should be the core roles of central banks in payments, it is important to understand how 
central banks are linked to payments and how they jointly evolved. 
 
One way of answering the question as to what roles a central bank should take on in payments is 
to start from their core purposes – the provision of monetary and financial stability – and ask 
what roles these imply.  This essay takes a different approach.  It asks why an economy would 
benefit from the presence of a central bank in the first place and assesses the implications of the 
answer to this question for the role of a central bank in payments.  As an aside, taking this 
approach also allows us to show why central banks should be concerned about monetary and 
financial stability.  In other words, this essay argues that central banks developed to perform a 
payments role and that their core purposes of monetary and financial stability stemmed from their 
performing this role. 
 
It is clear from the definition of payments given above that, in order for there to be payments, 
there first needs to be money.  In particular, in a barter economy where goods are exchanged for 
goods there are no ‘payments’ in the sense that I am using the word.  So, in Section 2, I discuss 
why money might evolve as a result of some frictions inherent in real-world economies.  Section 
3 then discusses the evolution of banks.  It argues that banks developed in order to provide 
payment services (making ‘money’ work more efficiently);  banks as intermediaries channelling 
savings into investment came later.  Section 4 discusses how banks can save on the use of 
collateral to make payments – collateral that they can convert into loans to earn a return – by the 
development of ‘payment systems’.  Such systems will involve some form of netting of payments 
(clearing) and final settlement in some asset.  ‘Central banks’ fit into this picture by providing, in 
their liabilities, a settlement asset that the other banks are happy to use.  In so doing, they are 
incentivised to worry about monetary and financial stability.  Section 5 concludes with some 
(tentative) thoughts on the issue of a central banks role in payments today. 
 
2  Why have money? 
 
Money is commonly defined in economics textbooks with reference to its functions.  In particular 
anything that is generally acceptable as a medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value and 
means of deferred payment.  For instance, Baumol and Blinder (1991) define money as “the 
standard object used in exchanging goods and services.  In short money is the medium of 
exchange.”  They go on to say, “But once it has become accepted as the medium of exchange, 
whatever object is serving as money  … will inevitably become the unit of account … Money 
may also come to be used as a store of value.” 
 
3 In terms of the economics of payments, the key aspects of this definition are ‘medium of 
exchange’ and ‘means of deferred payment’.  Indeed, it is interesting, at this point, to pose the 
question as to whether or not the unit of account need be related to the medium of exchange.  
Even in a pure barter economy with no medium of exchange and n goods, say, having a standard 
unit of account would be useful since it means that agents would not have to know all possible 







) 1 (n n
 but simply the price of each good relative to the unit of 
account (n-1 prices). 
 
In fact, as pointed out by Rosenblat (1999) there are examples of barter societies that had units of 
account.  She cites Grierson (1977), for example, who, in turn cites documentary evidence from 
ancient Egypt, c. 1275 BC, in which a slave girl worth about 373g of silver was traded for 
clothes, blankets and a miscellany of other objects worth the same amount.  He also provides a 
couple of examples from the Iliad and the Odyssey.  In one example, suits of armour were 
exchanged, and in the other example, gold was exchanged for a slave, but the prices of all of 
these were expressed in terms of oxen. 
 
More recently, there were many examples in late mediaeval Europe where monetary systems 
were set up with a standard coin as the unit of account but where the coin disappeared from 
circulation long before it stopped being used as the unit of account;  that is, the unit of account 
differed from the medium of exchange.  Two examples cited in Quinn and Roberds (2005) are the 
French ecu of 1577 which operated as a unit of account for 25 years after it ceased circulating and 
the 1543 Dutch silver florin which had vanished from circulation by 1609 (when the Bank of 
Amsterdam was founded) but was still the unit of account in most of the Dutch Republic at that 
time. 
 
But why do we need a ‘medium of exchange’?  In the Arrow-Debreu world of general 
equilibrium and complete markets, we would not need to have a medium of exchange.  Indeed, 
microeconomic textbooks will typically consist of models in which there is no money and even 
macroeconomic models generally assume the existence of money rather than showing that it will 
exist in equilibrium.  So what is the imperfection that creates the need for money?  The model of 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) provides an answer to this question.  In what follows, I follow the 
description of this model given in Rupert et al (2000). 
 
Consider an economy with a unit continuum of infinitely-lived agents with discount rate r.  Each 
agent has the ability to produce one unit of a non-storable specialised good at a cost, c.  There is 
also a unit continuum of such specialised goods.  Agents do not like all goods, only some.  More 
concretely, I assume that a particular agent, i, will derive utility, u, from consuming a good 
produced by a different agent, j, with probability x and will derive no utility from it with 
probability (1-x).  To ensure that there are gains from trade, I assume that u > c.  I assume that the 
conditional probability that j likes consumer i’s good conditional on i liking j’s good is y.  So the 
probability of a ‘double coincidence of wants’ is xy.  Intuitively, it will be the fact that this 
probability is ‘small’ that leads to a role for money in the economy.  Finally, I assume that any 
agent i derives no utility from consuming his own good.  In this economy, there are also M 
indivisible units of a storable good – ‘money’ – that is intrinsically worthless, in that consuming 
4 it generates no utility.  At the beginning of time, a random group of M agents are each endowed 
with one unit of money.  I assume that no one holding money is able to produce a good. 
 
Agents trade bilaterally in this economy;  there is no central market where they can all meet.  
Instead, they meet each other according to a random pairwise matching process with Poisson 
arrival rate equal to unity.  I assume that the history of all agents’ past meetings and trades is 
private information and cannot be found out by anyone else.  Suppose agent i meets agent j.  If 
there is a double coincidence of wants, then they will trade with each other.  Alternatively, if i is 
carrying money and j can produce a good that i values, then i will wish to trade.  Whether or not j 
would be happy to trade with i in this case will depend on whether or not he believes that other 
agents will accept money from him in the future.  Suppose that j believes that a random agent will 
accept money from him in the future with probability β.  I consider stationary and symmetric 
equilibria in which the probability that j will accept money from i is also equal to β.  Ican write 
the value functions for those agents carrying money (V1) and those agents not carrying money 
(V0) as follows: 
 
  () ( 1 0 1 1 V V u M x rV ) − + − = β   (1) 
  () ( ) ( ) c V V Mx c u M xy rV − − + − − = 0 1 0 1 β   (2) 
 
Now, there will always exist at least one equilibrium:  that in which no agent accepts money, i.e., 
β = 0.  This demonstrates how the existence of (fiat) money depends on people believing that 
enough other people will accept it.  Note also that, if a monetary equilibrium exists, there will be 
two symmetric equilibria:  that in which β = 1 and another in which β equals some value between 
zero and one. 
 
Denote the net gain from trading goods for money by  c V V c − − = 0 1 0  and the net gain from 
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As I said earlier, a non-monetary equilibrium will always exist but, for the two monetary 
equilibria to exist, we need   and  .  Clearly the second condition holds for all 
possible values of our parameters. 
0 0 ≥ c 0 1 ≥ c
 
Monetary equilibria will exist provided agents are sufficiently patient since agents pay the cost of 
producing today to obtain money but only benefit from carrying money in the future when they 
meet someone who can produce a good they like and who will accept money.  Setting β equal to 
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5  
Similarly, monetary equilibria will exist if the gains from trade are sufficiently high.  Adopting a 
similar approach yields the two conditions: 
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So, I have shown that, given certain parameter restrictions, monetary equilibria exist in this 
model;  in other words, there is a potential role for money in eliminating the ‘double coincidence 
of wants’ problem.  But is the introduction of money welfare improving?  To examine this define 
welfare, W, by: 
 
  1 0 ) 1 ( MV V M W + − =   (8) 
 
In a  pure barter economy,  ) ( c u xy rW − = .  In a monetary economy, 
() β M y M c u M x rW + − − − = ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( .  Given this, we can see that the introduction of money 
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In other words, for the introduction of a given amount of money into the economy, this will be 











  (10) 
 
In words, this condition tells us that the introduction of money into the economy only improves 
welfare if there is a sufficiently small probability of a double coincidence of wants. 
 
But is this the only friction necessary to give money a role in the economy?  Kocherlakota (1998) 
asked whether there were other ways of overcoming the double coincidence of wants problem 
without using money.  He showed that, for money to be necessary in this sense, two other 
frictions were needed in the economy:  agents being unable to commit to repaying loans and 
trading histories of agents being private information. 
 
To see the importance of commitment consider what would happen if all agents adopted the 
strategy of producing for anyone who wanted their good.  If all agents could commit to this 
strategy, then there would be no need for money.  But even in a world in which agents cannot 
perfectly commit, it is still possible for this strategy to be an equilibrium if all actions are public 
information.  (Note that the strategy would need to include a specification as to what would 
happen once someone deviated;  a simple strategy would be to revert to only producing when a 
double coincidence of wants occurred.) 
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Kocherlakota (1998) formalised this in the following way.  He assumed that all transactions were 
recorded on a spreadsheet and that before agreeing to a trade an agent can costlessly observe the 
entries in this spreadsheet that correspond to the agent he is about to trade with, all agents that 
they have traded with in the past, all agents that these agents have traded with in the past, and so 
on.  So, if you went into a shop and asked for coffee, say, the shop-keeper could access the 
spreadsheet and check that you had produced enough for other people in the past to warrant being 
given coffee now.  If you had, he would simply give you the coffee.  Your ‘account’ on the 
spreadsheet would be adjusted accordingly.  Of course, the spreadsheet doesn’t exist in practice 
and the shop-keeper is unable to assess whether you have produced your good for other agents in 
the past, i.e., your trading history.  In its place, money acts as the system’s memory. 
 
Another way of thinking about this problem is to note that the equilibrium of all agents adopted 
the strategy of producing for anyone who wanted their good can be supported through agents 
taking actions that make it costly for them subsequently to deviate.  One such mechanism is the 
use of collateral – that is ‘buyers’ assign control over some assets to ‘sellers’, gaining control 
over other assets once they provide a service to someone else.  If an agent deviates, he would lose 
his collateral for ever;  this leaves a strong incentive not to deviate.  But, in this system buyers are 
simply exchanging assets for goods.  Hence, ‘money’ can be thought of as simply a replacement 
for collateral:  a ‘collateral asset’. 
 
So, I have shown that welfare is improved by introducing money into an economy with a ‘double 
coincidence of wants’ problem, limited commitment and private trading histories.  However, I 
have not discussed what this ‘money’ actually is.  The model discussed above has been set up as 
if money were purely fiat money, though it can easily be extended to the case of commodity 
money (as done in, say, Velde et al (1999)).  Indeed, these represent two different models of the 
emergence of money in practice. 
 
One model involves a government printing pieces of paper – this can be done either directly or by 
a central bank (an issue to which I will return) – and forcing the acceptance of these.  Typically, 
they could do this by making the notes ‘legal tender’ (meaning that creditors have to accept them 
from their debtors) or by forcing taxes to be paid using them, since agents would then know that 
they had a use for any notes they accepted from other agents.  One particularly brutal example of 
this approach can be found in the Mongol empire in the late thirteenth century described by 
Marco Polo in his ‘Travels in the land of Kubilai Khan’.  Kubilai Khan had paper currency 
printed and distributed it by ‘buying’ gold and jewels from his subjects using the notes.  He then 
imposed the notes as legal tender and imposed the death penalty on anyone who did not accept 
them.  Another example can be found in 19
th century Canada where ‘Dominion Notes’, printed by 
the Government and only partially backed by gold, became legal tender and also the settlement 
asset for interbank payments. 
 
The alternative model involves a gradual transition from commodity money to fiat money as 
private individuals (bankers) issued pieces of paper carrying a promise that they could be 
redeemed in terms of the commodity money.  As these notes circulated more and more and came 
to be redeemed less and less, they became ‘money’ and, as banks started lending, the quantity of 
7 notes in circulation came to be less related to the amount of commodity money backing them.  In 
the following section, I describe this story in more detail by considering how the need to safely 
store money led to the emergence of deposit banks and, as a corollary, the need for an interbank 
payment system. 
 
3  Why have banks? 
 
In the previous section I examined how a collateral asset called ‘money’ – that could take the 
form of either government-issued pieces of paper or a commodity with some intrinsic value – can 
solve the problems associated with a lack of any double coincidence of wants, lack of 
commitment and private information about trading histories.  The question for this section is:  
Can an economy develop arrangements involving privately-issued debt (inside money) that 
enable it to get closer to the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the face of a limited supply of this 
collateral asset?  Such arrangements are what we have come to think of as a ‘payment system’.  
Indeed, the Bank for International Settlements defines a payment system as ‘a set of instruments, 
banking procedures and, typically, interbank funds transfer systems that ensure the circulation of 
money.’ 
 
Of course, before there could be a set of ‘banking procedures’ there needed to be ‘banks’.  One 
story for the emergence of banks is that they were originally moneychangers.  Using commodity 
money (e.g., silver coins) to make large-value payments was inefficient given the relatively low 
values of the coins and the wide variety and quality levels of different coins circulating;  it was 
much more efficient for merchants to deposit their coins with moneychangers – who had a 
comparative advantage in being able to value coins – and for transactions between merchants to 
happen across the books of the moneychangers rather than for coins to be counted out and valued 
for each and every transaction.  In this way, moneychangers became early deposit banks.  (See 
Kohn (1999).)  Payments were made with both payer and payee present at the bank.  Where the 
payee did not hold an account at the payer’s bank, he either opened one or could ask the bank to 
transfer the money to his own bank.  Since banks were close to each other, this was done by the 
payer’s banker walking over to the payee’s banker with the money. 
 
Another reason why merchants would deposit their coins with moneychangers, gold and 
silversmiths and even innkeepers and monasteries was for safekeeping:  carrying money around 
is unsafe since it can be stolen.
( ) 1   Goldsmiths, in particular, had strong safes and could offer 
protection for a merchant’s money while he was trading.  So, merchants would deposit their 
money with goldsmiths who would charge them a small fee and issue them with a receipt.
( ) 2   
These receipts represented a form of debt and, eventually, this debt became ‘transferable’ in the 
sense that it became possible for a merchant who wished to make a purchase to transfer the debt 
to the seller as payment for his goods.  Final settlement occurred when the sellers went back to 
the goldsmith to call in the debt. 
 
                                                                    
 
1 Indeed, this story also holds true in an economy in which government-issued fiat money is circulating. 
2 One such form of receipt was the ‘bill of exchange’ on which the goldsmith would promise repayment of the 
money on a particular date at a particular (distant) location. 
8 Now, one way of making debt transferable was to issue it to ‘the bearer’;  such debt acted as 
private ‘banknotes’.  Of course, private banknotes are just as subject to theft as commodity 
money or public banknotes.  So, an alternative was for the goldsmith to issue the merchant with 
debt that required the merchant’s signature in order for it to be transferred.  As emphasised by 
Kahn and Roberds (2002), since either form of debt was negotiable – that is was issued and 
transferred according to a clear set of rules concerning the liabilities of buyers, sellers and third-
party debtors at all points in the transaction chain – they both had the advantage of offering a 
means of final payment;  in other words, they became ‘money’ (inside money) themselves. 
 
He et al (2005) develop a model of banks based on these ideas.  The idea is that merchants 
deposit their (outside) money with banks who issue them with transferable debt that requires 
signing over (what they refer to as ‘cheques’).  What follows is a description of their basic model 
– ‘exogenous theft’ – though they discuss a number of extensions in their paper.  The 
environment is much the same as described in the model of Section 2, above, so I will only 
comment on what is different.  The key change is that a proportion, λ, of the agents not holding 
money are ‘thieves’.
3  In a meeting between an agent carrying money and a thief, the thief 
attempts to steal the buyer’s unit of money.  He is successful with probability γ and, if he 
succeeds, incurs a cost  .  This cost is motivated by a desire to capture in a simple way the idea 
that theft imposes negative externalities on society as a whole.
z
( ) 4   If there were no cost of theft, 
then theft would simply represent a transfer of resources and have a zero effect on aggregate 
welfare.  The only other change is that I assume that the probability of a double coincidence of 
wants, xy in Section 2, above, is zero and, so, barter trade never occurs.   
 
The Bellman equations for an agent holding money and one not holding money are, respectively, 
 
 ] )[ 1 ( ] )[ 1 )( 1 ( 1 0 1 0 1 V V M V V u M x rV − − + − + − − = γλ λ    (11) 
 ] [ ] )[ 1 ( 0 1 0 1 0 z V V M c V V xM rV − − + − − − = γλ λ   (12) 
 
In a monetary equilibrium both types of agent must prefer to be active in the economy rather than 
drop out and live in autarchy.  This implies:    and  .   What is more, when a producer 
meets a buyer who wants his good, the producer needs to have an incentive to accept a unit of 
money as payment.  This implies  .  Given these conditions, I need only check that 
 and   because when these conditions both hold it must be that  . 
0 1 ≥ V 0 0 ≥ V
c V V ≥ − 0 1
0 0 ≥ V c V V ≥ − 0 1 0 1 ≥ V
 
As before, the autarky equilibrium in which no-one accepts money will always exist but, in 
addition, a monetary equilibrium will exist if the gains from trade are sufficiently large.  In 
particular, He et al (2005) prove that monetary equilibria exist if and only if 
c
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3 Here, I interpret ‘money’ as publicly-issued banknotes though it can be easily extended to encompass commodity 
money and/or privately-issued banknotes. 
4 A part of this cost of theft can also be thought as a proxy for the deadweight cost of using cash.  By this, I am 
thinking of ‘cash handling’ costs, which can be significant in practice, as well as the actual costs of producing notes 
and coin. 
9  
The next step in building up their model is to add banks.  Following He et al (2005), I allow 
agents to deposit their money into banks for safekeeping.  The bank issues them with a cheque 
book and charges a fee, φ, for the provision of this service.  The key advantage of using cheques, 
rather than cash, is that they cannot be stolen.
( )   5 In providing the service, they incur a cost, a, per 
unit of money deposited.  I assume that banks are subject to 100% reserve requirements and, so, 
do not issue loans and always redeem cheques drawn upon them.  Perfect competition in the 
banking sector then implies that φ = a. 
 
Following He et al (2005), I assume that each period consists of two sub-periods:  ‘day’ and 
‘night’.  The model as described to date consists of the actions of agents at night.  During the day, 
agents produce and consume a ‘general good’ that is nonstorable.  Utility is linear in the 
consumption of this good for all agents.  The purpose of introducing this general good is to allow, 
in effect, the transfer of utility;  I need to do this in order that agents can pay the fees they owe 
their banks, which they do in terms of general goods.  Since trade in the decentralised market is 
anonymous, agents cannot use claims on future general goods in the decentralised market unless 
these are claims drawn on a bank.  It is also during the day that agents redeem their cheques, 
either by opening up an account at the bank of the agent who paid them for their good the 
previous night, or by walking the money from this bank to their bank.  I assume that this can be 
done with perfect safety (perhaps because the banks are so close together or because the transfer 
is done with heavy security). 
 
Let θ  be the probability that an agent with money deposits it in the bank, Vd be the value of an 
agent with money in the bank, exclusive of the fee (equal to a as said above) and Vm be the value 
of an agent who chooses to carry cash.  Then V1 = max {Vm,Vd - a}.  The Bellman equations are 
as follows: 
 
  d m d V V V V u M x rV − + − + − − = 1 0 ) )( 1 )( 1 ( λ   (13) 
  m m V V V V M V V u M x rV − + − − + − + − − = 1 1 0 1 0 ) )( 1 ( ) )( 1 )( 1 ( γλ λ   (14) 
  () ( )( ) z V V M c V V xM rV − − − + − − − = 0 1 0 1 0 1 ) 1 ( θ γλ λ   (15) 
 
Now, depending on the values of the parameters, we could identify four possible equilibria: 
 
a) Autarchy:     and  0 0 1 < − − c V V 0 0 < V  
b) Cash:   0 = θ ,  ,  a V V d m − ≥ 0 0 1 < − − c V V  and    0 0 ≥ V
c) Mixture:    1 0 < <θ ,  ,  a V V d m − = 0 0 1 < − − c V V  and    0 0 ≥ V
d)  Payment system:   1 = θ ,  a V V d m − ≤ , 0 0 1 < − − c V V  and    0 0 ≥ V
 
Note that, as I said earlier, autarky will always be an equilibrium.  He et al (2005) Proposition 2 
shows the conditions under which each of the other equilibria exist.  They show that if a 
                                                                    
 
5 To be more precise, the point is not that cheque books cannot be stolen, rather that they cannot be used by anyone 
except the particular individual on whose account they draw.  This means that there is no incentive for thieves to rob 
any agent who was not carrying cash. 
10 monetary equilibrium exists without banks, it will still exist with banks;  moreover, the addition 
of banks widens the set of parameters over which a monetary equilibrium will exist.  In other 
words, the existence of safe places for storing money will encourage its use in situations where 
otherwise the presence of thieves would have rendered it too risky to accept.  Furthermore, He et 
al find that a lower supply of money makes it more likely that agents will use banks.  In this light 
we can see the development of banks partly as a result of the need to economise on the use of 
money – the collateral asset. 
 
But a way of economising even more on the use of outside money was to issue even more inside 
money;  that is, for banks to start issuing loans to their customers.  The model of Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2000) shows how the addition of inside money – via the conversion of private debt 
arrangements into bank debt – can substitute for lack of collateral in a limited commitment 
economy.  In particular, in their model they have farmers who need to borrow in order to make 
investments that pay off two periods later but are unable to commit all of their future output 
towards paying off the loan.  Furthermore, they assume that debt issued by these agents is non-
transferable.  These frictions lead to underinvestment, lower than optimal output, a ‘jagged’ path 
for consumption – in particular, involving overconsumption at the time the investment projects 
produce output – and a negative ‘liquidity premium’ on long-term debt.  Kiyotaki and Moore then 
add ‘banks’ to the model.  In their model, banks issue transferable debt (inside money) against the 
non-transferable debt issued by the farmers.  The presence of banks enables better consumption 
smoothing, albeit at a direct output cost since they require capital, which depreciates, to operate 
but produce no output themselves. 
 
In our context, we might think of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (2000) ‘farmers’ as merchants whose 
‘investments’ involve paying their foreign suppliers and whose payoff occurs when they sell their 
wares to final consumers.  Without banks, a merchant would need to issue his own (non-
transferable debt) in order to raise the funds to pay his suppliers.  Final consumers would then 
pay with outside money, and the merchant pay off his creditors with this outside money.  With 
banks, the merchant writes cheques to his suppliers.  These cheques represent transferable debt of 
the bank.  Allowing the merchant to write cheques implies the granting of an overdraft facility;  
this can be thought of as a non-transferable debt issued by the merchant.  In this way the bank has 
changed a non-transferable debt into a transferable one.  Two periods on, the merchant sells his 
wares to consumers and deposits the proceeds in his bank.  At the same time, the suppliers cash 
their cheques at the bank, which pays up using the outside money deposited by the merchant. 
 
Kahn and Roberds (2002) have a similar story.  Again, a merchant needs to make a payment to a 
supplier and he can do this by issuing his own (non-transferable) debt.  He turns the supplier’s 
goods into final output that he sells on to final consumers.  The difference between their model 
and that of Kiyotaki and Moore (2000) is that, in this case, consumers issue debt to pay the 
merchant.  If this debt is non-transferable, the merchant will have to wait until it is paid off before 
paying off his supplier;  if it is transferable – that is the consumers have used cheques or 
banknotes to pay the merchant – the merchant pays off the supplier immediately and the supplier 
eventually calls in the debt from the consumers.  The key point in both models is that, where 
three or more parties form a ‘credit chain’, the transfer of debt of the most reliable party can 
affect ‘final’ settlement.  In addition, both models suggest that, by allowing agents to economise 
11 on collateral (including outside money), the introduction of inside money can improve upon 
allocations involving only outside money. 
 
But, eventually, the circulation of inside money still leads to a requirement for the presence of 
outside money.  In particular, when cheques are cashed or payments are ‘walked’ from one bank 
to another bank, outside money still needs to be present.  This fact, and the general shortage of 
outside money, encouraged the banks to develop sophisticated ‘banking procedures and … 
interbank funds transfer systems’ (i.e., payment arrangements) in order to economise on the need 
for it.  The development of payment systems is tackled in the next section of the paper. 
 
4  Clearing, settlement and central banking 
 
In describing how interbank funds transfer occurs we need to consider the settlement agent, the 
settlement institution and the ultimate settlement asset.  The BIS defines the settlement agent as 
an institution that manages the settlement process (e.g., the determination of settlement positions, 
monitoring of the exchange of payments, etc.) for transfer systems or other arrangements that 
require settlement.  I refer to this process as ‘clearing’.  The BIS defines the settlement institution 
as the institution across whose books transfers between participants take place in order to achieve 
settlement within a settlement system.  I refer to this process as ‘settlement’. 
 
We could imagine, at least, three models for clearing and settlement: 
 
•  A series of bilateral arrangements involving each pair of banks determining their bilateral 
positions and settlement in outside money 
 
•  A mutually-owned clearing house calculating the multilateral net positions of each bank and 
settlement in outside money.  (In practice, this might involve the banks lodging outside 
money with the clearing house and the clearing house transferring the claims to this outside 
money, similar to the way gold is moved between different piles held at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to effect some international payments today.) 
 
•  A central bank – one of the banks creates accounts for the other banks and what are 
transferred are the liabilities of this one bank.  In other words, the liabilities of this bank 
become the ultimate settlement asset – ‘outside money’.  In this situation, the multilateral net 
positions of each bank could still be calculated by a clearing house that was operationally and 
legally separate to the central bank.  The key is that final settlement is effected in central bank 
money.  Furthermore, the universal acceptability of this bank’s liabilities meant that it could 
temporarily expand these as a way of easing liquidity crises without their losing value.  In 
other words, this bank was in a position to act as the ‘lender of last resort’.
( ) 6  
                                                                    
 
6 Gorton and Huang (2002a) showed that a mutually-owned clearing house could act as a lender of last resort issuing 
its own liabilities against the mutualised assets of the clearing house members.  Indeed, the New York Clearinghouse 
did just that in the late 19
th century in the United States.  But Gorton and Huang (2002b) suggest that central banks 
are necessary since they mitigate the externality of disruption to transactions that is associated with bank panics.  
Indeed, it was this problem – exemplified by the banking panic of 1907 – that led to the formation of the Federal 
Reserve system in the United States. 
12  
As argued earlier, such arrangements developed as a response to the general shortage of outside 
money (collateral assets).  Now, one immediate way of reducing the money (collateral) needed to 
effect payments is to use netting.  In other words, banks realised that it was cheaper not to settle 
payments in full as and when they arose but, rather, keep a ‘running tab’ showing how much they 
owed each other bank net of what each other bank owed them.  Eventually, they moved to a 
situation where they submitted all the individual payments to a central ‘clearer’ that could 
calculate the net amount due to/from each bank from/to all other banks (as opposed to each of the 
others).  Final settlement – walking the money from one bank to another – occurred either after a 
set period of time, typically the end of each day, or when the net balance became larger than a 
certain amount (bilateral or multilateral credit limit). 
 
It is straightforward to show that the amount of money (collateral) needed to effect final 
settlement in a multilateral net settlement system is smaller than the amount needed to effect final 
settlement in a bilateral net settlement system and this, in turn, is smaller than the amount needed 
to effect final settlement in a gross settlement system.  Kahn, McAndrews and Roberds (2003) 
examine the advantages of net settlement systems and find that, in addition to reducing the need 
for collateral, they reduce the incentives for banks to default on their payment obligations where 
payment occurs with a lag relative to delivery.  Hence, a move from gross settlement to net 
settlement can lead to an increase in trade. 
 
In what follows, I concentrate on the netting benefits.  To model these, let there be n banks.  On 
day t, bank i receives notes drawn on bank j equal in value to Xji,t. So, the net position of bank i 
vis-à-vis bank j for day t is  .  I assume that, although bank i knows X ji ij X X − ji,t he cannot 
observe Xij,t until bank j presents banks i’s notes for final settlement.  In order to make the netting 
benefits clear (and to abstract from issues about the precise timings of payments in a real-time 
gross settlement system affecting the amount of liquidity needed) I assume that, in the absence of 
a netting arrangement, bank i would need to hold collateral equal to ∑
j
t ij X ,  in order to make all 
his payments on day t.  The expected benefit to bank i of agreeing to a bilateral netting 
arrangement with bank j would then be  ( ) ( ) ( ) ji ij X E X E Min , .  Following this argument through, 
bank i would gain from bilateral netting arrangements with all banks whose notes it was 
receiving. 
 
Now suppose that all n banks got together to form a multilateral arrangement.  In particular, 
suppose that the banks formed a mutually-owned clearing house that carried out the netting and 
effected final settlement in outside money.  The netting benefits obtained by bank i within such a 
system would be   where the inequality is 
strict provided that bank i is a net payer of at least one other bank and a net payee of at least one 
other bank.  Aggregating this up implies that the multilateral system will require less collateral 
than a set of bilateral arrangements provided that at least two banks are either both net payers or 
net payees.  In addition, a multilateral arrangement is likely to be less costly than a set of bilateral 
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13 arrangements since it only involves only n transfers of outside money as opposed to 
2




The next question to answer is how the development of clearing houses are related to the 
development of central banks.  In the situation discussed above, the clearing house acts solely to 
calculate the net amounts due from/to each bank.  Final settlement still involves the movement of 
collateral (outside money), albeit across the floor of the clearing house’s vaults.  Of course, this 
in itself represented an efficiency gain as collateral stored in the clearing house vaults would be 
made secure from theft than collateral being transported between banks.  The key difference 
between this system and one involving a central bank is that final settlement is enacted via the 
transfer of balances across the books of this bank;  that is, the liabilities of this bank become the 
settlement asset.  And the key advantage of this is that the central bank need not hold any of the 
original collateral asset to back its liabilities (though, of course, there would be an issue about 
whether the other banks would be happy to use its liabilities to settle payments if they were not 
backed by ‘safe’ assets). 
 
Again I can calculate the collateral savings.  For and bank i that is not the central bank, the 
savings will still be  .  For the central bank (bank k, say), the savings 
will be  .  In other words, an arrangement involving a 
central bank will achieve at least as large a netting benefit as in a multilateral arrangement with 
settlement in outside money and a greater benefit when the central bank is a net payer.  The 
number of transfers required is the same in each of the two systems suggesting that a central bank 
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In terms of the economics of social networks, I have shown that a payments network involving 
multilateral clearing and a central bank is ‘efficient’ in the sense that the total benefits accruing to 
the n banks is larger than under any alternative network.  This leaves the question of whether 
such a network is stable.  Following Jackson (2005), I define a ‘pairwise stable’ multilateral 
payments arrangement to be one in which no bank wishes to leave the arrangement and no two 
banks wish to deal bilaterally with each other. 
 
To check whether the central bank arrangement is pairwise stable, consider non-central banks i 
and j that are members of the system.  Suppose they make no payments to and from each other.  
Then setting up a bilateral arrangement would incur some cost and yield no benefit.  If they do 
make payments to and from each other, creating a bilateral link and shifting their payments out of 
the multilateral arrangement will never lead to a reduction in their collateral needs, while still 
imposing some cost.  The central bank will be linked to every bank it deals with and so setting up 
a bilateral arrangement with any other bank would incur some cost and yield no benefit.  So, this 
network is stable against the addition of links.  Now consider banks i and k where bank k is the 
central bank.  Delinking will create a need for bank i to create an arrangement with another bank j 
for making its payments to all the banks in the network (a ‘correspondent banking arrangement’).  
14 In this case, bank i will need the same amount of collateral as in the original multilateral 
arrangement but bank j will need collateral equal to   
.  The total number of links will be the same suggesting a similar cost 
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The problem with the network I have described above is that it is, in general, not unique.  Any 
bank that is a net payer is a candidate for being the central bank.  One way of narrowing the set of 
possible equilibria is to impose the entire cost of supporting the network onto the central bank;  in 
the multilateral netting system involving a clearing house the cost would likely be born jointly 
across all the banks.  Suppose this cost is c.  Then a bank (bank k, say) would only wish to 
become the central bank if 
n
n c
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This all suggests a need to adapt the model so as to explain why one particular bank, rather than 
another, might become the central bank and why such a bank would wish to become the central 
bank given that it is costly to do so. 
 
One answer to the question suggested by the analysis above is that a bank that was a large net 
payer is most likely to become the central bank.  But, if this were the case, the bank’s liabilities 
would be increasing over time.  The equilibrium would only be sustainable if the other banks 
remained happy to use the central banks liabilities as the settlement asset and this, in turn, implies 
a need for these liabilities to not grow to fast (that is inflation to be low) and to be backed by 
‘safe’ assets that could easily be grown over time.  Unlike other banks in the United Kingdom at 
the time, the Bank of England – as a joint stock company – was able to raise capital without 
having to rely on just a handful of individuals.  This enabled it to grow its assets.  In addition, the 
bulk of its assets were government bonds – seen as particularly safe.  Finally, since it was the 
government’s bank, it was, at least initially as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, a large net payer.  
In the context of the model, these factors would suggest that the Bank of England would emerge 
as the central bank.  For such central banks, the granting of ‘legal tender’ to its money (as 
happened to Bank of England money in 1833, for example) merely confirms the position of 
ultimate settlement asset that it has already achieved. 
 
But more often there was no bank that could fit these criteria and emerge as the central bank.  In 
these cases, the alternative involved the government simply creating a central bank and paying 
for the cost of running the system out of general taxation.  In continental Europe, ‘Public Banks’ 
(as they were called) grew up as a regulatory answer to the problem of large-scale bank failure.  
(See Kohn, (1999) and Quinn and Roberds (2005).)  In particular, various governments felt the 
need to set up institutions specialising in payments, that is, not engaging in intermediation and so 
not subject to failure.  As these institutions were not able to make a profit, their costs were paid 
for by government.  Examples of public banks that were successful include the Banco di Rialto in 
Venice and the Bank of Amsterdam (after which the Bank of England was modelled).  More 
recently, governments have set up central banks at the same time as which they have created a 
fiat money – the money of their central bank – and enforced legal tender properties on it.  Given 
15 this, the central bank money became the obvious settlement asset in these countries.  There are 
many examples of this including the Federal Reserve System in the United States, the Bank of 
Canada and, most recently, the European Central Bank. 
 
As discussed in the motivation for this paper, central banks around the world today generally 
share two core purposes – the provision of monetary and financial stability.  But these 
responsibilities arose naturally once the bank’s liabilities became the ultimate settlement asset. 
 
To see this, I first note that once this happened, this bank could elastically increase the supply of 
its liabilities in times of crisis to enable payments to happen;  in other words, it becomes able to 
act as the lender of last resort.
( ) 7   In addition, it had an incentive to do this since if it allowed a 
solvent commercial bank to fail as a result of a run, it would only aggravate the situation and this 
could ultimately result in a run on itself.  Put differently, profit maximisation is consistent with 
Bagehot’s (1873) rule that a central bank should always lend to liquid but solvent institutions 
against collateral.  This also creates an incentive for the central bank to minimise the likelihood 
of this happening, that is, to ensure a generally stable financial system (financial stability).  
Furthermore, this will create a need for the central bank to monitor individual banks so as to 
ensure that it does not lend to insolvent banks.  However, if it is taxpayers’ money that is used to 
finance such lending, the incentive is for the government to ensure that banks are properly 
monitored;  whether this is done by the central bank or a different authority (such as the Financial 
Services Authority in the United Kingdom) is a choice for the government. 
 
In addition, as discussed above, privately-owned providers of the ultimate settlement asset also 
have incentives to maintain monetary stability by ensuring that their liabilities do not grow at too 
fast a rate.  In particular, if it printed more and more of its notes without a corresponding increase 
in the demand for them, the notes would fall in value relative to those of other banks.  Eventually, 
it would no longer be seen as ‘safe’ and it would lose the revenue it obtained from acting as the 
settlement institution.  One way of ensuring that its notes were seen as ‘safe’ was to obtain a 
government guarantee – which could take the form of its notes being declared as legal tender.  In 
that case, it would be able to increase the circulation of its notes without affecting their 
acceptability;  in turn, this would enable the central bank to ensure that payments were made even 
in adverse circumstances.   In this case, the bank would be likely to try and make profits from 
seignorage, provided the government allowed it to keep these profits and did not appropriate 
them for itself.
( ) 8   Profit maximisation would likely lead to a rate of inflation that was low and 
stable, though it is also likely that this would be higher than optimal. 
 
                                                                    
 
7 The Federal Reserve was set up to do just this.  The full title of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 reads, ‘An act to 
provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of 
rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for 
other purposes’ (my italics). 
8 For instance, as a result of the Bank of England Act of 1844, the UK government is entitled to the seignorage 
revenue made from the production of Bank of England notes. 
16 5 Conclusions   
 
In this review essay, I have attempted to explain the economics behind the evolution of payments.  
In so doing, I first assessed why the introduction of money – by which I mean either commodity 
money or pure fiat money issued by a government – into a barter economy can be welfare 
improving.  Following, inter alia, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Kocherlakota (1998) I argued 
that money can overcome the ‘double coincidence of wants’ problem in an economy in which 
agents are unable to commit to repaying loans and their trading histories are private information.  
Following, inter alia, He, Huang and Wright (2005) and Kohn (1999) I then argued that the 
introduction of banks could further improve the situation by addressing the twin problems that it 
is hard to assess the quality and legitimacy of money and that money is subject to theft. 
 
But even with banks there would still be a need for some money to be present to effect final 
settlement.  The general shortage of money in the middle ages encouraged the banks to develop 
sophisticated ‘banking procedures and … interbank funds transfer systems’ (i.e., payment 
arrangements) in order to economise on the need for it.  Payment systems typically reduced the 
need for money via netting:  initially bilateral netting between pairs of banks but eventually 
multilateral netting across a group of banks.  The netting would be carried out by a mutually-
owned clearing house and final settlement would be effected via the transfer of outside money. 
 
Having described the benefits to such systems, I then examined the further improvement that 
could be offered if the settlement was carried out across the books of one of the banks:  a ‘central 
bank’.  I argued that, in addition to a further saving of collateral, once this happened it became 
possible for the central bank to act as a lender of last resort and that, in turn, this led it to become 
concerned about financial and monetary stability.  In other words, I argued that central banks 
developed to perform a payments role and that their core purposes of monetary and financial 
stability stemmed from their performing this role. 
 
So, what are the core roles of a central bank in payment systems?  Clearly, where banks require 
final settlement in an asset that they deem to be ‘as good as gold’, the liabilities of the central 
bank should be the settlement asset.  Where there liabilities are being used, it is clear that they 
need to exercise control over them;  banks would soon stop settling in the liabilities of the central 
bank if the central bank were seen to have no control over them.  But there is nothing in the 
analysis that suggests the central bank should either own or operate the systems (that is, carry out 
the ‘clearing’) subject to maintaining control over the supply of its liabilities.  Having said that, 
the lender of last resort function suggests that in times of general liquidity shortages, the central 
bank needs to be able to get its liabilities out to those banks that need them.  Perhaps the most 
efficient way of ensuring this is for the central bank to be a member of any system where their 
liabilities were used as the settlement asset.  But it also suggests that the central bank needs to 
ensure that these systems keep operating in times of liquidity shortages, either by operating the 
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